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FORUM
THE VIEWS OF JUSTICE REHNQUIST
CONCERNING THE PROPER ROLE OF THE
STATES IN NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS POLICY
Bruce Comly French*
I. INTRODUCTION
The opinions of Justice William H. Rehnquist reflect a clear trend
in favor of state sovereignty within the federal system. His opinions, as
well as those in which he has joined, tend to advocate restriction of
federal court jurisdiction in matters affecting states,' while others
breathe life into the view that the tenth and eleventh amendments to
the Constitution enhance state powers.2 Consequently, those opinions
* Legislative Counsel, Council of the District of Columbia. B.A., The American Univer-
sity-, M.A., The American University; J.D., Antioch College School of Law.
1. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976) ("Where an injunction against a criminal
proceeding is sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 'the principles of equity, comity, and federalism'
must nonetheless restrain a federal court."); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 92 (1975) (by
implication) (where state criminal proceedings are pending, it is an abuse of federal district court
discretion to issue preliminary injunctive relief since state courts are fully competent to decide
constitutional issues in such cases); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) ("A suit by pri-
vate parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treas-
ury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment."); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 554 (1974)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (jurisdiction over supremacy clause claim may not be grounded as an
pendent claim upon an insubstantial equal protection claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 which served
as a ruse to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 where the claim did not exceed
$10,000).
2. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852-55 (1976) (Congress may not
exercise its commerce power "so as to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential
decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made). The court
ultimately held that the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act extending minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions to public employees of the states and their political subdivi-
sions violated the tenth amendment. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (dissenting from opinion holding that a Presidential Executive Order which
1
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which analyze competing state and federal statutes are often result-ori-
ented in favor of the state.
The relative extent of state power when faced with directly con-
flicting or potentially clashing congressional enactments is one measure
of this emerging view of the balance between federal and state interests.
The analysis of the conflict is occasioned by the supremacy clause's
injunction that "this Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land. . ..
The supremacy clause thus sets the stage for the judicial doctrine
of preemption, which requires state enactments directly conflicting with
enactments of the Congress in the same field to be rejected.' The nub
of the controversy, of course, is whether the conflict is total; whether
Congress intended the federal law to fully occupy the field and thus
preempt the state or local enactment; or whether there is a way in
which to harmonize the statutes.6
imposed limitations on salaries paid state employees, was not violative of the tenth amendment);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See also Lind, Justice Rehnquist: First Amendment
Speech in the Labor Context, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 94-96 (1980); Rehnquist, The Notion of
a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 693 (1976).
3. For cases that exemplify the type of result-oriented opinions which Rehnquist authors,
see notes 1-2 supra.
4. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
5. Professor Tribe has asserted the premption problem as follows
The question whether federal law "preempts" state action, largely one of statutory
construction, cannot be reduced to general formulas. In evaluating patterns of statutory
interaction, the Supreme Court has declared generally that whether challenged state ac-
tion has been pre-empted on whether or not it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Since
congressional purposes can be either substantive or jurisdictional, a state action may be
struck down as an invalid interference with the federal design either because it conflicts
with the actual operation of a federal program, or because, whatever its substantive im-
pact, it intrudes upon a field that Congress has validly reserved to the federal sphere.
L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-24 (1978). Preemption matters in conflicting
state and federal relations are most pronounced in labor law matters. See note 9 infra and accom-
panying text.
For an analysis of related preemption problems between the federal authority concerning
Native Americans and the state, (opinions joined by Justice Rehnquist during his tenure on the
Court) see Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 696 (1979) (dissenting opinion);
United States v. John, 437 U.S. 635 (1978); Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U.S.
165 (1977); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
6. Professor Tribe identifies essentially three preemption issues. First, are those in which
the state power conflicts with the power Congress has exercised in that field. Second, are those
conflicts between state power and that which Congress might have exercised, so-called "dormant"
congressional power. Finally, Congress may legislatively reserve to the federal government the
power to act in a certain area. Therefore, any exercise of state power within this legislative vac-
uum is held invalid regardless of how consistent the state statute is with the federal scheme. L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTUIONAL LAW § 6-23 (1978). For an excellent example of harmoniz-
2
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The substantive law of labor and management relations is often
the most explosive example of the doctrine of preemption. Under the
Labor Management Relations Act,7 state criminal and tort laws often
collide with the rights afforded 8 or denied.9
Labor law opinions authored and joined by Justice Rehnquist of-
fer an opportunity for analyzing his view of the proper balance be-
tween state law interests and the national policies favoring collective
bargaining.'" Similarly, a quick "once over lightly" review of the Jus-
tice's authored opinions concerning preemption matters in maritime
and environmental regulation and state property laws will be presented
to show the consistency of his opinions regarding state and federal law
conflicts."
This article will examine the various opinions of Justice Rehnquist
by first examining the narrow construction given to federal statutes on
labor matters. 2 As will be seen, this is an apparent attempt to ensure
state authority and jurisdiction in those matters. The most important
decisions in this area are those construing the "affecting commerce"
clause of the National Labor Relations Act as well as the appropriate
reach of the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction. Second,
the preemption doctrine will be examined in the context of the contin-
ued validity of state criminal and tort laws in those matters affecting
ing the intent of two federal statutes and their impact on labor law, see New York Tel. Co. v. New
York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979) (plurality opinion).
7. Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976).
8. Section 157 of the Act provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in sec-
tion 158(a)(3) of this title.
Id. § 157.
9. See id. § 158.
10. Other opinions not discussed in this article which provide a perspective of Justice Rehn-
quist's view concerning labor law doctrine include NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S.
490 (1979) (church schools not within the jurisdiction of the NLRB); Howard Johnson Co. v.
Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974) (successorship bargaining obligations); NLRB v. Boeing
Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973) (fines of union members for crossing a picket line); NLRB v. Bums Secur-
ity Services, 406 U.S. 272, 296 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(successorship doctrine). For other helpful articles concerning labor law preemption, see note 23
infra. See also Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REa. 623 (1975).
11. See text accompanying notes 122-133 infra.
12. See notes 16 through 44 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 17:76
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national labor relations. 3 Here, those cases falling within the tradi-
tional preemption analysis will be examined. Though Justice Rehn-
quist has authored no opinions in this area, he did join in the New York
Telephone 14 opinion, an exceedingly pro-labor opinion which supports
his notion of fundamental state sovereignty within the federal system.
Finally, the concept of preemption and federal-state relations in other
fields will be examined.15 The decisions in this area are important in
that they demonstrate Justice Rehnquist's consistency with his labor
law opinions.
II. NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL STATUTES TO ENSURE
STATE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION IN LABOR MATTERS
In expounding the underlying philosophical underpinnings of Jus-
tice Rehnquist's views, commentators have emphasized that in resolv-
ing conflicts between state and federal authority, he usually concludes
that the state authority should be exercised.' 6 This has meant that he is
often in the minority in Supreme Court opinions, but his opinions have
shown remarkable consistency in explicating this principle. It is not
surprising, then, when reading federal statutes from this viewpoint, that
an interpretation is advanced which narrows the reach of federal au-
thority to one which allows full play to state court jurisdiction and the
effectuating of state laws.
In his first two major labor relations opinions, Justice Rehnquist
narrowly construed a definition within the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) to find no jurisdiction in the NLRB. Resulting from this
threshold determination, the Court then concluded there was no bar to
the issuance of state court injunctions to control picketing under neu-
tral state statutes. Both cases, Windward Shipping (London) Ltd v.
American Radio Association'7 and American Radio Association v. Mo-
bile Steamship Association,'" turned upon the meaning of the phrase
"affecting commerce"'19 within sections 2(6) and (7) of the Act."° In 6-3
13. See notes 45 through 121 infra and accompanying text.
14. 440 U.S. 519 (1979) (plurality opinion).
15. See notes 122 through 133 infra and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Shapiro, Mr. Justice R~ehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REv. 293, 294
(1976).
17. 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
18. 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
19. 415 U.S. at 105.
20. In this regard, the Labor Management Relations Act provides in pertinent part:
(6) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or com-
munication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Terri-
4
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and 5-4 decisions, Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinions of the
Court which found no jurisdiction in the NLRB under the Act.
In Windward Shoping, suit was initiated by the managing agents
of two Liberian flag ships in a Texas state court to enjoin picketing by
American maritime unions. The ships in question were operated by
foreign nationals in foreign unions, and called upon foreign ports.2'
While the picketing was peaceful, an injunction was sought under a
Texas tort statute when representatives of other unions declined to
cross the picket lines. The state trial court determined that the NLRB
had at least arguable jurisdiction over originally protected union activ-
ity.22 As a result, under the Supreme Court's holding in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon,23 state court jurisdiction was pre-
empted, and the NLRB's authority was exclusive.
The Court traced a series of earlier decisions which emphasized
the primary application of the Labor-Management Relations Act24 to
"American workingmen and for their employers' 25 and not to foreign
nationals. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the unique nature and tra-
dition of maritime employment precluded its inclusion within the
phrase "affecting commerce," and that a special cue from the Congress
to disturb this conclusion would be required. The dissenters posed the
political reaction that seamen are entitled to attempt to save their jobs
from foreign economic competition. A statutory reaction was also
posed that, because the case arguably falls under the Garmon rule, ju-
risdiction is properly vested in the NLRB in the first instance.26
tory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between points in the same
State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any
foreign country.
(7) The term "affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or ob-
structing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a
labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.
29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6) & (7).
21. 415 U.S. at 106.
22. Id. at 108. '
23. 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959): If the NLRB decides, subject to appropriate federal judicial
review, that conduct is protected by § 7, or prohibited by § 8, then the matter is at an end, and the
states are ousted of all jurisdiction. For a thorough analysis of the Garmon rule, see notes 45-101
infra and accompanying text. See also Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemp-
tion, 41 OHIo ST. LJ. 277 (1980); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337
(1972).
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976).
25. 415 U.S. at 110 (emphasis in the original) (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo,
353 U.S. 138, 144 (1957).
26. The threat of foreign economic competition was conceded. 415 U.S. at 122 (Brennan,
Douglas, and Marshall JJ., dissenting).
[Vol. 17:76
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In American Radio Association v. Mobile Steamshp Association,27
Alabama state courts issued a temporary injunction against picketing
substantially similar to that complained of in Windward Shipping. In
this instance, the injunction was sought by stevedores and shippers,
rather than by the owners and agents. Petitioners here claimed that the
activity complained of was the converse of the facts in the related case
and arguably prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA.2 8 Again,
the Court declined to assert exclusive NLRB jurisdiction, removing the
potential for state court jurisdiction because it concluded that the "af-
fecting commerce" issue (a threshold determination for jurisdictional
purposes) was adversely resolved in Windward Shipping. The dissent-
ers, more numerous here than in Windward Shiping, pressed the argu-
ment of the existence of an unlawful secondary boycott which was
properly the subject of exclusive review by the NLRB. This conclusion
on the merits would have been reasonable had the jurisdictional deci-
sion been resolved in a contrary fashion.2 9
While the decision in Windward Shpping presents a closer ques-
tion whether the federal labor relations laws are applicable than in
American Radio Association, the latter decision was able to serve Jus-
tice Rehnquist's general opinion that the preclusion of state court juris-
diction is not to be lightly inferred. The definitional interpretation of
"affecting commerce" strains the common and ordinary understanding
of the phrase, but the outcome does effectively limit exclusive federal
authority in these picketing cases. The niggardly analysis of the
breadth of the NLRA is to be contrasted with the expansive brush
which has painted a broad field to benefit the exercise of state jurisdic-
tion.30 A more principled approach to the result-oriented conclusion of
these two decisions would be to find NLRB jurisdiction under the plain
meaning of the statute, but to carve out an exception to the exclusive
27. 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
28. Id. at 220. This provision prohibits inter ala:
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or
to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other em-
ployer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his
employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing con-
tained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, any primary strike or
primary picketing;
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B). 419 U.S. at 236-244 (Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall,
JJ., dissenting).
30. See notes 45-133 infra and accompanying text.
6
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jurisdiction of the Board similar to that found in the cases below.3'
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB 32 and joined
by the Chief Justice, held that the NLRB's remedial order constituted
an actionable trespass under Texas state law not authorized by the
NLRA. At issue in this complicated factual case in which six members
of the Court joined the majority, was whether a union newsletter could
be distributed over an employer's objection during nonworking hours
in nonworking areas of the employer's premises. The majority of the
Court emphasized those portions of the union newsletter which the em-
ployer had conceded were legitimate union expression.33 Furthermore,
the Court found that the private property issues did not outweigh the
union's "mutual aid or protection" rights34 because the union repre-
sentatives were already lawfully on the premises. Thus, the majority
concluded that the basic issues related to economics and labor relations
and not to property rights. 35 Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, focused
upon technical common law property law distinctions. He concluded
that the limited exceptions to the employer's fundamental right in his
private property did not justify the opening up of the premises for the
political advocacy questions presented.36
In Eastex, Rehnquist quarreled with the majority's and the
Board's treatment of the owner's property fights. He would maintain
the state property law rights unless the primacy of the total repudiation
of state law is shown by a clear indication of Congressional intent.
Finding no such intention here, he would maintain those traditional
state property rights to the owner.
The existence of some protected activity having been conceded in
Eastex, the Justice was confronted with a complicated judicial and ad-
ministrative balancing act. The outline of his scheme suggests that
those matters directly within the competence of the NLRB were prop-
erly resolvable in that forum, but that more effort must be made to give
the state substantive law its due.37 State substantive law is here again
31. Compare 415 U.S. at 109-15 with the holding at 115. The Court undertook the recom-
mended analysis but rendered a definitional holding.
32. 437 U.S. 556, 579 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 561.
34. Id. at 564. For the text of the statutory language, see note 8 supra.
35. 437 U.S. at 573.
36. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., and Burger, CJ., dissenting). The narrow displacement of state
property law to accommodate the legitimate distribution of union materials must be honored.
Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 544-45 (1972); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S 793, 805 (1945).
37. 437 U.S. at 580.
[Vol. 17:76
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honored by creating a conflicting maze of procedural hurdles through
which litigants must negotiate before a final conclusion is reached in
their judicial journey.
Contrasting with these three result-oriented opinions, is one which
benefits a uniform federal administrative practice over the individual
and his pursuit of state law remedies. While Justice Rehnquist is a
strong supporter of the administrative state3 8 and often votes with gov-
ernment in litigation against the individual, Andrews v. Louisville and
Nashville Railroad39 suggests another paramount jurisprudential con-
cept of Justice Rehnquist - the limitation upon the federal judicial
forum.41 In writing for the Court in a 7-1 opinion, Justice Rehnquist
reviewed the legislative history of various enactments affecting the right
of railway workers to bring suit for wrongful discharge. Petitioner An-
drews had filed a suit in the Georgia state court complaining of a
"wrongful discharge" following an automobile accident unrelated to
his railway employment. The company removed the case to federal
court, and then had the case successfully dismissed on the grounds of
failure to exhaust the administrative remedies by appearing before the
National Railroad Adjustment Board. The Court's opinion focused
upon the exclusive nature of the bargaining agreement and its appro-
priate interpretation by the Board, even though Andrews had no inter-
est in returning to his employment with the railroad.4 ' In short, said
the Court, the nature of any employer obligations to Andrews were
based upon the contract and not a Georgia state law.
In dissent, Justice Douglas characterized the problem in a totally
different light, focusing upon the Georgia law, and the remedies sought
by Andrews, which did not include reinstatement and back pay which
might be awarded by the Railroad Board.42 Douglas concluded that
the petitioner had no interest in further association with the railroad,
nor with the union under the collective bargaining agreement. Because
any statutory or common law remedy would have no impact upon the
continued operations of the railroad and its relations with the unions
38. "A consistent and contemporaneous construction of a statute by the agency charged with
its enforcement is entitled to great deference... by the Court." NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S.
67, 75 (1973). See United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 413 (1973) (Douglas, Rehnquist, Pow-
ell, J.J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting, (strong federal public policy of strict enforcement of the
Hobbs Act should be honored).
39. 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
40. See note I supra.
41. 406 U.S. at 324.
42. Id. at 327 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
8
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under the collective bargaining agreement, no national policy would be
served by forcing Andrews to go before the Board.43 Thus, Andrews
should have been allowed his option of a judicial forum in the first
instance.
Ironically, it is Justice Rehnquist who emphasizes the desirability
of a single administrative forum for grievances which historically were
optionally available before the Board or a trial court. The argument of
exclusive jurisdiction within the federal agency does not appear to be as
well developed as in the Garmon deferral cases discussed below, but an
alternative policy objective of minimizing the burden of lawsuits must
surely have driven the Justice to close out this avenue of redress.44
III. CLASSICAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The essence of the conflict between federal and state authority
often flowers in a labor controversy. For here, one is presented with a
longstanding national policy favoring the organization of workers into
unions in order to promote industrial peace and stability45 contending
with the state's interest in deciding its local employment disputes.
While specific exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB
have long existed, the general judicial statement of the NLRB's exclu-
sive jurisdiction was set forth in the seminal opinion of Garmon46 in
1959. The touchstone of the policy is:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities
which a State purports to regulate are protected by section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair
labor practice under section 8, due regard for the federal en-
actment requires that state jurisdiction must yield ....
When an activity is arguably subject to section 7 or section 8
of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer
43. Id. at 330 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. See note I supra.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) provides:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal
by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and
other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation
of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occuring in the current of commerce;
(c) materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or manufac-
tured or processed goods from or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such
materials or goods in commerce, or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in
such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or
into the channels of commerce.
Id.
-46. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
[Vol. 17:76
9
French: The Views of Justice Rehnquist Concerning the Proper Role of the
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
19811 LABOR, THE STATES AND JUSTICE REHNQUIST 85
to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations
Board if the danger of state interference with national policy
is to be averted.47
The general approach of Justice Rehnquist in classical preemption
cases is hinted at in his dissenting opinion in Eastex.4 8 Not having
written an opinion expressly on the question of preemption by the
NLRA, Justice Rehnquist's views must be gleaned from his joining in
the opinions in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 4 9 Hudgens v. NLRB,
50
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin,5 ' Farmer v. United Brother-
hood of Carpenters,52 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters,53 and New
York Telephone Co. v. New York Department of Labor.54 The positions
adopted by Justice Rehnquist in the cases noted above can be roughly
described as follows.
First amendment picketing rights should not be broadly construed
and, in the context of labor relations, the appropriate standard for eval-
uation is the statutory one, the NLRA, and not the first amendment.55
This view undercuts the preemption argument to the extent that the
NRLB is the appropriate forum to generally resolve such matters, but it
47. Id. at 244-45.
48. See 437 U.S. at 579-83 (1978). In this case involving employees' distribution of union
literature on the employer's premises, the Court held that the right to distribute the literature was
protected by § 7 of the NLRA and preempted the employer's private property rights. Id. at 572-
76. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the literature was primarily political, rather than
concerned with union organization or bargaining. Since it did not pertain to union activities, Mr.
Rehnquist found the literature excluded from § 7 protection and argued that the employer's right
to control activity on his private property should prevail over employees' attempts to distribute
political literature. Id. at 579-83.
49. 407 U.S. 539 (1972). (case remanded for reconsideration of employer's property rights vis
A vis union's use of employer's parking lot for union literature distribution after determining
whether the union had other means readily available to reach employees).
50. 424 U.S. 507 (1976). (remanded to NLRB to be determined on NLRA basis alone and
not on first amendment considerations).
51. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
52. 430 U.S. 290 (1977). (unanimous holding that NLRA would not preempt state court
jurisdiction over tort action arising out of internal union relations not directly related to employ-
ment discrimination).
53. 436 U.S. 180 (1978). The Court held that where the controversy presented to a state court
was not the same as a controversy that would have been presented to the NLRB, the state court
action would not be preempted since no danger of overlapping jurisdiction, prohibited by the
Garmon rule, existed. Further, state court jurisdiction in these circumstances would not be pre-
empted where a party who could have raised an NLRA issue failed to do so.
54. 440 U.S. 519 (1979). (enactments of NLRA and Social Security Act were not intended to
preempt states' power to pay unemployment compensation to strikers).
55. See notes 43 & 44 supra. Cf. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 472 (1980) (Rehnquist and
Blackmun, J.J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting) (would uphold carefully drawn Illinois statute con-
cerning residential picketing) and Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Lab. Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119 (1977) (upholding state prison regulations as rational and not conflicting with first
amendment).
10
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enhances the role of state substantive law in non-labor-relations picket-
ing cases by permitting a state supreme court to adopt a state constitu-
tional law analysis of the state's first amendment analogue which
differs from the federal interpretation. 6
Furthermore, state substantive law should prevail in cases of tort
standards57 and state welfare benefits,"8 absent a clear signal from Con-
gress that state adjudication of these matters would disrupt the feder-
ally created balance between labor and management in labor
bargaining. In circumstances where a matter was arguably covered by
the Garmon rule, 9 preemption would not be ordered where the matters
properly susceptible to state court resolution 60 would not affect the na-
tional policies of the NLRA. The Garmon rule seems amenable to
shading in either direction, due to what might have been an error in
legal strategy by counsel for the labor organization in failing to make
any complaint to the Labor Board in Sears.6
A. Picketing by Labor-Resolution under the NLJRA and not the First
Amendment
Justice Rehnquist joined the opinion of the Court in both Central
Hardware62 and Hudgens.63 Both of these cases involved labor repre-
sentatives' picketing on private property which was objected to by the
owners involved. In Central Hardware, the retail clerks' union held an
organizational campaign of non-employee union members on one of
Central's parking lots.' The company's uniform and neutrally applied
no-solicitation rule was applied against the union, after Central had
received complaints from some of its employees concerning union har-
assment.65 The question clearly framed was whether the Court's earlier
decision in Logan Valley66 or in Babcock & Wilcox 67 served as the basis
56. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-88 (1980); Note, Robins v.
PruneYard Shopping Center. Federalism and State Protection of Free Speech, 10 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 805 (1980).
57. Farmers v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
58. New York Tel. Co. v. New York Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
59. See note 23 supra.
60. E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978). (unauthorized trespass).
61. 436 U.S. at 202-07.
62. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
63. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
64. 407 U.S. at 540-41.
65. Id. at 541.
66. Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), over-
ruled sub silentio, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
67. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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for assessment of the enforceability of the state trespass statute. Logan
Valley focused upon first amendment rights in characterizing the shop-
ping mall as "the community business block," 68 while Babcock & Wil-
cox focused on a statutory standard, the NLRA, to balance
management's property rights with labor organizers' rights.69
The analysis of Babcock & Wilcox is narrowly drawn to the lim-
ited access given organizers in prescribed non-working areas of the em-
ployer's premise for the limited duration of the organizational
campaign.70 This, the Court concluded, was a fair balancing between
the respective organizing and property rights of labor and manage-
ment.'1 The dispute in Central Hardware was remanded to the NLRB
for consideration in light of the NLRA principles of Babcock & Wil-
cox, rather than the constitutional principles of Logan Valley. Ironi-
cally though, as the dissenters noted, it was conceptually possible to
find the NLRA rights to be broader than the first amendment in the
context of an organizational campaign, and thus a more severe restric-
tion on property rights might be compelled.7 2
As a sequel in Central Hardware, the Court considered Hudgens,73
clarifying its earlier opinion and its relation to picketing by union
members in furtherance of a strike, rather than in organizational cam-
paign trespassing as in Central Hardware.74 In Hudgens, the union
pickets were employees of a warehouse of a shoe store company having
a retail outlet in a shopping center.75 The owner of the shopping center
indicated that he would have them arrested for violating his no-solicita-
tion rule. The pickets contended that their presence was in furtherance
of a strike against the shoe company which was protected activity.76
After canvassing the applicable cases, the Court remanded the matter
to the NLRB to clarify its confusing reliance upon Logan Valley.77 The
proper test was to assess "conflicts between section 7 rights and private
property rights, 'and. .. seek a proper accommodation between the
tWo.' "5.78
68. 391 U.S. at 319.
69. 351 U.S. at 113-14.
70. 407 U.S. at 545.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 548 (Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
73. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
74. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
75. 424 U.S. 507, 590 (1976).
76. Id. at 490.
77. Id. at 523.
78. Id. at 521.
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Having adopted the statutory rather than the constitutional stan-
dard, Justice Rehnquist was required to defer to the NLRB in the con-
text of labor and management relations. In non-labor law areas, his
own coup de grace was delivered in Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Rob-
inS79 in which the state court interpretation of state constitutional
speech and picketing rights was allowed to be more expansive of the
federal standard that was articulated in Lloyd v. Tanner.80 This harmo-
nization of rights in this sensitive constitutional area allows for the de-
velopment of alternative standards in different states and is the logical
step in an effort to make states full partners in a federal system. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters8 is the most interesting case concerning
preemption in which Justice Rehnquist joined the majority. Even the
statement of the question suggests the answer that should prevail under
Garmon, but an exception emerged which Justice Rehnquist was read-
ily able to endorse:
The question in this case is whether the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, deprives a state court of the power to
entertain an action by an employer to enforce state trespass
laws against picketing which is arguably--but not defnitely-
prohibited orprotected by federal law. 82
Under the traditional statement of the Garmon rule, it is clear that this
question would be an appropriate one for resolution by the NLRB. In
Sears, representatives of the carpenters union engaged in peaceful
picketing in a Sears parking lot in Chula Vista, California. The state
court issued a temporary restraining order directing that the carpenters
leave Sears' property. 3
The state court of appeals relied upon the final clause of the Gar-
mon rule, "the potential danger of state interference with national pol-
icy,' 84 as the leg that allowed it to sustain the injunction, even though it
appeared to fall within the ambit of the rule. 5 The court noted that the
79. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See, Note, New York Telephone v. New York State Department of
Labor Limiting the Doctrine of Implied Labor Law,- Preemption, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 297
(1980); and Note, State Unemployment Benefits to Strikers andthe Preemption Doctrine, 11 U. ToL.
L. REV. 143 (1979).
80. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). In a 5-4 decision, the Lloyd court held that mere size and general
invitation of the public for business purposes were not sufficient to change the private character of
a large shopping center where there was no accompanying assumption or exercise of municipal
functions or power. Id. at 569-70.
81. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
82. Id. at 182 (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied).
83. Id. at 182-83.
84. 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
85. 436 U.S. at 183.
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injunction was narrowly drawn to "'location of the controversy as op-
posed to the purpose of the acts ... and did not deny the Union effec-
tive communication with all persons going to Sears.' "86 The state
supreme court reversed, holding that the conduct was arguably pro-
tected or prohibited under Garmon and thus subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRB.87 In analyzing the allegedly prohibited
union conduct (recognitional picketing rules under section 8(b)(7)(C))88
or the allegedly protected conduct (securing compliance by Sears with
standards under section 7),89 the Court assessed the actions which
might have been taken before the NLRB. Regarding the section 8 vio-
lation, the Court concluded that the location of the pickets was irrele-
vant to the outcome (and thus the state court order did not constitute
interference with the national policy) 90 and concerning the section 7
protections, a fuller federal protection is afforded.91 The prohibited
conduct branch focuses upon the impact of the state court jurisdiction
over a common nucleus of facts relevant to state law and the risk of
interference with the regulatory jurisdiction of the NLRB. 92 In this
case, the nature of the section 8 unfair labor practice charge would
have dealt with the picketing in general, and not as a result of its loca-
tion.93 Thus, even if the federal board held that an unfair labor prac-
tice had been committed it would not interfere with the locational
aspects of the state trial court order.94 Thus, preemption over the nar-
86. Id. at n.5.
87. 436 U.S. at 184.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) provides:
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section 159(c)
of this title being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from
the commencement of such picketing; Provided, That when such a petition has been filed
the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions of section 159(c)(1) of this
title or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organi-
zation, direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall
certify the results thereof: Providedfurther, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall
be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members
of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to
induce any individual employed by any other person in the courts of his employment,
not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services. Nothing in
this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which would otherwise be an
unfair labor practice under this subsection.
Id.
89. For text of section 7, see note 8 supra.
90. 436 U.S. at 186.
91. Id. at 199-208.
92. Id. at 196.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 198.
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rowly drawn state court order is not warranted.95
"Considerations of federal supremacy . . . are implicated to a
greater extent when labor-related activity is protected than when it is
prohibited. ' 96 The Court concluded that the union was obliged to file
an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB because the company
had no effective means of presenting the protected activity charge to the
Board.97 In what might be considered a poor display of lawyering, the
union instead chose to indicate its willingness to comply with a state
court order ("legal process") to evict it from the premises.98 Of final
significance was the Court's statement in dictum that, "Experience
under the Act teaches that. . . situations where trespassing is protected
are rare and that a trespass is far more likely to be unprotected than
protected." 99 Thus, the state supreme court's decision was reversed and
the authority of the trial court to enjoin the picketing on Sears' prop-
erty was sustained. By joining with the Court in this opinion, Justice
Rehnquist concurred with an opening wedge into an area directly con-
trolled by Garmon. His opinion in PruneYard presages a reassertion of
state power, with all of its diversity, in an area previously viewed as
exclusively federal.
The various opinions of the Court'00 are instructive as an indica-
tion of the current balance between property rights and picketing and
the federal and state constitutional interplay under the expanding doc-
trine of federalism. Justice Rehnquist, as the primary proponent of ex-
panded state's rights, is carrying the day in this clash between the
federal and state governments for hegemony. PruneYard is indeed a
bellwether.
The aftermath of Sears has been a cautious exercise of state court
jurisdiction. 101 Courts have been tempted to assess the strength of the
protected activity under the two-prong analysis of Sears, which gave
greater weight and strength to protected rather than prohibited activity.
The outcome, however, is far from certain. A more balanced approach,
95. Id.
96. 436 U.S. at 200.
97. Id. at 201 & n.33.
98. Id. at 202.
99. Id. at 205.
100. Compare the opinion of the Court, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), with id. at 89 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring), id. at 95 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), andid. at 96 (Powell
and White, JJ., concurring in part and in the judgment).
101. See Note - Labor Law - Federal Preemption - TheAftermath of Sears, 27 VAYNE L. REv.
313 (1980).
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designed to effectuate federal collective bargaining policy, calls for
deferral to the NLRB in peaceful picketing circumstances under Gar-
mon and resort to state courts for injunctions to enjoin violence on the
picket line. Garmon's line of "arguable" jurisdiction appears to be the
best test under the national policy, but it is certainly one which
strengthens the NLRB at the interface between state and federal juris-
diction. Justice Rehnquist would applaud Sears and further narrow
Garmon.
B. Furtherance of Policies of State Substantive Law Not Dfrectly
Affecting the Collective Bargaining Process
In three cases affecting state law, two cases involving tort actions
and one affecting unemployment compensation benefits to strikers, the
views of Justice Rehnquist became known. The two tort cases involved
litigation against unions for various activities. In Farmer v. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters,1°2 a unanimous Supreme Court held in an
opinion by Justice Powell that the NLRB does not preempt an action in
state court to recover damages for the intentional tort of emotional dis-
tress against union officials. Pendent federal claims concerning dis-
crimination and breach of contract claims against the union were
dismissed by the trial court to minimize potential state court interfer-
ence with the NLRA and EEO rights.
In Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. 4ustin,10 3 Justice Rehnquist
joined with two other dissenting Justices in finding that the NLRA did
not preempt a state court action for defamation."° In Austin, nonunion
members of a bargaining unit were depicted as "scabs" by a local union
newsletter. In the nonunion members' suit against the union for defa-
mation, the state trial and supreme courts sustained an award of dam-
ages in the amount of $145,000 for each of the litigants.10 5 The United
States Supreme Court determined that the Virginia courts had not
given sufficient attention to the standard of first amendment freedoms
mandated in labor disputes. i6 The "hard" language of the newsletter
102. 430 U.S. 290 (1977). See Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Comm'n,421 U.S.-132, 156
(1976) (Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (should allow state court to enjoin unlaw-
ful strike); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (malicious libel); UAW v. Russell,
356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youndahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United Construction Work-
ers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (damage action for labor dispute violence).
103. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
104. Id. at 291 (Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 269 & n.4.
106. Id. at 272.
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must be protected because of the robust nature of debate and hyperbole
that is part of labor organization and union relations with its members.
The dissenters, including Justice Rehnquist, concluded that the loose
standard adopted by the majority ran roughshod over the reputation
rights of the dissenting union members.10 7 The solution of the dissent
was to reverse and remand for a new trial with clearer jury standards
that were more favorable to the litigant's ultimate ability to collect a
judgment. 108
New York Telephone Co. v. New York Department of Labor,10 9 the
most complex case to be considered by the Supreme Court in recent
years, involved the relations of state law to federal labor relations pol-
icy. Here, announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Rehnquist and White, concluded that a New York
state law which authorized the payment of unemployment compensa-
tion benefits to strikers did not require rejection under federal preemp-
tion doctrine."t 0 All Justices concluded that this strike payment did
benefit labor at the expense of management. The plurality, including
Justice Rehnquist, concluded that Congress was aware of the potential
problem of burdening management in a labor dispute, but that it gave
no indication that the burden was impermissible as part of the collec-
tive bargaining system."' The Court opined that cases involving pre-
emption of state laws specifically impacting upon labor relations (or
laws of general application having an effect upon collective bargaining)
were nonapplicable." 2 The dissenters, of course, viewed the national
relations policy as preempting this "employee benefit" state law. They
found no expression of legislative intent to suggest that Congress had
even remotely considered the full ramifications of this local state law.
Thus, preemption was appropriate in maintaining the balance in labor
relations." 13
The significance of New York Telephone is not only its favoring
the emerging narrow reading of what is exclusively protected or pro-
hibited under the NLRA, I 4 but also its profound legal implications for
federal and state relations analysis. As in Sears, which threaded a thin
107. Id. at 295 (Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 297.
109. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
110. Id. at 527-42.
111. Id. at 530-31;see/d. at 549-50 (Blackmun and Marshall, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
112. Id. at 532.
113. Id. at 551-67 (Powell and Stewart, JJ., and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
114. See notes 45-121 vupra and accompanying text.
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line through a minefield of arguable jurisdiction of the NLRB, New
York Telephone firmly articulates the view that Congress must show
preemption by specific direction, rather than through some ambiguous
signals coming from various statutory provisions.' 5 This view is even
more pronounced in several environmental regulation cases in which
Justice Rehnquist is ironically in dissent." 6
If New York Telephone is followed, reliance upon a carefully rea-
soned and developed federal scheme in an area of clear federal author-
ity in assessing whether a state statute should be preempted will be
insufficient. As all litigating parties agreed, the New York State
scheme burdened the NLRA's policy of labor and management collec-
tive bargaining. Nonetheless, with the scant legislative history of both
the NLRA's enactment and the contemporaneous enactment of title IX
of the Social Security Act," 7 the Court was unable to find that the Con-
gress intended to eliminate the option of states to provide strikers un-
employment compensation benefits. Likely, the matter was not
considered in any depth, but it is clear, as the dissenters point out, that
this decision moves to add a "state law burden" to the balanced na-
tional policy."t8 It is of considerable irony that the "state's rights" ad-
vocacy of Justice Rehnquist has benefitted labor in this instance. Woe
be to labor in a decision emanating from a right to work state 19 or
other less receptive jurisdictions. 20
The sum of this view is consistent with that advanced by Justice
Rehnquist in general federal and state opinions analyzed below.'' By
giving full effect to all or, in some cases, a large portion of a state law,
Justice Rehnquist accomplishes an objective of aggrandizing state
power. Similarly, in relations between the federal government and the
115. See note 121 infra.
116. See notes 122-133 infra and accompanying text.
117. 49 Stat. 639, as amended and recodified as the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26
U.S.C. § 3301-3311 (1976), 42 U.S.C. § 501, § 1101-1108 (1976). Compare 440 U.S. at 526-27 with
id. at 561 (Powell and Stewart, JJ., and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
118. 440 U.S. at 560-67 (Powell and Stewart, JJ., and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
426 U.S. 407 (1976). (Justice Stewart's opinion in dissent concluding that a state right to work law
applied should be contrasted to the majority in which Justice Rehnquist joined). Id. at 422 (Stew-
art and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
120. See American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
121. "Preemption, then, if it is to exist at all in this case, must exist because the operation of
the state Act inexorably conflicts with thepurposes underlying the Federal Act." Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 545 (1977) (Rebnquist and Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in origi-
nal); New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (Rehnquist
joining in majority opinion by Powell) (clear and manifest evidence of Congressional intent to
preempt must be shown).
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states, the Justice demands an unequivocal statement by the Congress
that a particular regulatory or statutory scheme is intended to preempt
all state activity in the subject matter area. New York Telephone, like
Sears and PruneYard, shares and supports the objective of creating di-
versity within the federal system and enabling the states to develop in a
manner consistent with a local tradition, rather than being melted into
one undistinguishable state.
IV. PREEMPTION AND FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN OTHER
FIELDS: A CONSISTENCY WITH LABOR LAW OPINIONS
Justice Rehnquist has consistently limited the reach of federal stat-
utes. Two notable examples of environmental regulation conflicts in-
clude tanker pilotage and size regulation in Puget Sound and airplane
noise ordinance controls in Burbank, California. In Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. ,122 Justice Rehnquist joined with Justice Marshall, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part, to find that a portion of the
Washington state statute was preempted (a conclusion of the unani-
mous court), while arguing in dissent that the absolute size limitation
upon vessels entering Puget Sound was not preempted by federal law
or regulation. While believing that the Secretary of the Federal De-
partment of Transportation had unexercised jurisdiction to preempt the
related state statute, he found that the federal and state schemes could
be harmonized. Similarly, in City ofBurbank v. LockheedAir Terminal,
Inc. ,13 he concluded that an insufficient showing of implied federal
preemption of all local regulation was presented. Thus, in both of
these instances, in the absence of specific legislative language or a com-
pelling legislative history to preempt related state statutes in an area of
federal cognizance, he affords state law latitude to regulate in the inter-
ests of the general federal statute. These opinions represent a princi-
pled and consistent analysis of the preemption issue.
In two opinions involving air and water pollution programs ad-
ministered by the federal Environmental Protection Agency, 124 both
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stewart found sufficient intent in the acts
122. 435 U.S. 151, 181 (1978) (Marshall, Brennan and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
123. 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973) (Rehnquist, Stewart, White, and Marshall, 1., dissenting). See
id. at 640-650 for an analysis of the preemption argument by the dissenters.
124. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) and EPA
v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (Stewart and Rehn.
quist, JJ., dissenting). See also Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325
(1973) (no federal preemption of Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act).
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of Congress to allow state governments to control the operation of fed-
eral facilities within those states through a permit system administered
by them. In these two dissents, Justice Rehnquist differed with the ma-
jority which failed to find the requisite degree of clarity in the federal
laws to express congressional intent to force federal instrumentalities to
comply with state officials' implementation of federal-state plans.' 25
Here, the result-oriented decision of strengthened state governments
was well supported by a textual reading of the federal enactments.' 26
The additional justification sought by the majority appeared to be un-
warranted in light of the specific language of the statutes.
In Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead27 and Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, Inc. ,128 Justice Rehnquist, in separate opinions, concurred in
the Court's judgment but indicated that he would not tread as broadly
as the majority opinion. Thus, again, he would preempt only state laws
specifically drawn into conflict of question by the federal enactments.
In a procedural decision, a limited reach of the federal rules was
honored in Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 70.129 In His-
quierdo v. Hisquierdo,'30 Rehnquist joined with Stewart's dissent favor-
ing the continued validity of and application of community property
regimes in California. Malone v. White Motor Corp. 131 authorized col-
lective bargaining over pension systems in accordance with state law.
Justice Rehnquist joined with the majority in federal and state copy-
right relations cases132 and with the dissent in a case of state taxation of
125. Hancock, supra note 124, at 189 (Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (agreeing with
the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1974); see EPA v.
California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., supra note 124, at 228 (Stewart and Rehn-
quist, JJ., dissenting) (agreeing substantially with the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in this case,
511 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1975).
126. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
127. 441 U.S. 141, 151 (1979) (Rehnquist and White, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
128. 431 U.S. 265, 287 (1977) (Rehnquist and Powell, JJ., concurring in the judgment, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
129. 415 U.S. 423, 445 (1974) (Rehnquist, Stewart, and Powell, JJ., and Burger, C.J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (would hold more narrowly than majority). For an interesting analysis of
this opinion see Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 293, 334,
n.192 (1976). Cf. General Atomic Company v. Felton, 434 U.S. 12, 19 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (order in issue only applies to future litigation and does not offend federal court
orders).
130. 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (would hold that federal
Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 contemplated continued application of California community
property law, rather than majority treatment of the marital benefit provisions). Cf. Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 78 (1979) (follow state laws concerning property rights of a bankrupts'
assets).
131. 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
132. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1973) (state protection of trade
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the fruits of a federal instrumentality, 33 favoring the state.
These decisions give the greatest breadth to state laws and their
interplay with federal enactments. Federal laws are construed nar-
rowly to give full breadth to state laws, and where they are in partial or
apparent conflict, Justice Rehnquist reaches for a result-oriented con-
clusion which favors harmonizing the statutes to the benefit of state
authority, consistent with the general principles elucidated in his other
labor law opinions.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: HYPOTHESES
Justice William R. Rehnquist has a consistent judicial outlook
which is reflected in his opinions concerning federal and state relations.
In short, he looks for ways to sustain state exercises of power in the face
of conflicting or clashing federal enactments so that the state laws may
live. He attempts to avoid federal constitutional decisions which bene-
fit the federal government, while striving to find federal statutory bases
to support state constitutional or statutory activities.
Where there is conflict between his principle of conservative read-
ing of federal constitutional protections, he will err on the side of ex-
pansive reading of state constitutional provisions initially propounded
by a state supreme court. Decisions of federalism will be his hallmark
to the expense of other principled decisions he may wish to endorse. In
this manner, his jurisprudential philosophy is consistent with his polit-
ical view, and carries out the objectives of the man who nominated him
to the bench-Richard M. Nixon. As a "modem" states' rights activist,
Justice Rehnquist will continue to exercise a profound influence on the
Court in the decades ahead.
secrets does not violate federal law or require preemption); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546
(1973) (no total premption of state copyright laws).
133. See United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363, 381 (1973) (Douglas and Rehn-
quist, JJ., dissenting from remand to lower court to consider supremacy clause claim not previ-
ously addressed) (dissenters would have allowed the states to charge taxes upon liquor imported
by the federal government for non-governmental functions over which the federal government has
exlcusive jurisdiction.
[Vol. 17:76
21
French: The Views of Justice Rehnquist Concerning the Proper Role of the
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
